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Abstract
This paper analyses the potentially defensive behaviour of patent race winners and its e¤ect
on aggregate R&D e¤ort. It proposes a quality-ladders model that endogenously determines
leaders technology advantages and who innovates (the leader rm or its competitors). Product
market regulation can have either a positive or a negative e¤ect on R&D intensity. It can be
negatively associated to aggregate innovative e¤ort in highly deregulated economies. In more
regulated ones, where deterring strategies are constrained, it provides incentives to innovate.
These predictions are consistent with data on manufacturing industries for 14 OECD countries
during the period 1987-2003.
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1 Introduction
Several empircal studies based on R&D surveys show that rms protect the value of their
innovations using multiple strategies (Levin et al., 1987; Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Cohen et
al., 2002). It is argued in this paper that this multiplicity is important to understand the
e¤ect of competition on R&D incentives. If rms have several alternatives to keep their prots,
potential competition may not necessarily act as a slack-reducing device. Rather than neutral
innovative behaviour, the thread of competition can in practice trigger defensive reactions of
incumbents. They can construct di¤erent types of strategic barriers aiming at protecting their
business position from the risk of loosing future innovation contests.1 The aim of this paper is to
analyse the impact of this defensive behaviour on aggregate R&D e¤ort and market structure.
Particular attention is devoted to the way in which market regulation can inuence aggregate
R&D e¤ort.
The paper rst proposes a quality ladder model where R&D races are structured by strategic
barriers, the cost of which is assumed to be positively correlated with regulation. Within a Stack-
elberg game of the kind presented in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), an important contribution
of the model is that the new successful innovator strategically acquires R&D cost advantages
vis-à-vis his competitors. These advantages allow him to further innovate. The main result is
that regulation can have either a positive or a negative e¤ect on R&D intensity. It all depends
on the pre-existing regulation level. In more liberal environments the equilibrium is charac-
terised by a long-life innovative monopolist. Here an increase in regulation will be detrimental
to innovation because it distorts the innovative activity of the leader. However, after attaining
a certain threshold of regulation, the economy experiments Schumpeterian replacement. In this
case, regulatory provisions can positively inuence aggregate R&D e¤ort since they reduce the
deterring e¤ect on outsiders. Because of Schumpeterian incentives stemming from the technol-
ogy gap between leaders and followers, this positive impact is all the more important that the
size of innovation is bigger.
The starting point to understand these results is to conceive regulation as a device con-
straining the set of available strategies, namely those leading to entry deterrence in R&D. In the
model this kind of strategies are illustrated by the choice made by the leading rm regarding the
direction of the innovative path. The idea is that innovation is not only a purely product/process
1Consistent with R&D surveys ndings, Crépon and Duguet (1997) show evidence of negative R&D external-
ities among French manufacturing rms in narrowly dened industries, a result interpreted by the authors as the
outcome of competitorsrivalry.
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improvement but a strategically biasedone. Regulation can (de facto) limit the possibilities of
technological manipulation (think in certications, anti-bundling, quality controls, certications,
licensing, etc). An important point is that even some usually-called market barriers can t this
denition. Theoretically speaking, all that is needed is a rule that directly or inderectly sets
the boundaries of the business process and product containing the state-of-the-art knowledge.
This is why the empirical excercise deliberatly uses indicators constructed to measure market
barriers.2
Models predictions are tested using industry-level data of OECD countries for the period
1987-2003. Several indicators of regulation provided by the OECD appear positively correlated
with R&D intensity in high-tech industries, precisely those industries where the size of innovation
usually yields big innovative jumps. Consistent with the model, once the sample is split to
investigate a di¤erentiated e¤ect of regulation on R&D intensity, a negative correlation shows-
up in highly deregulated environments. The opposite is observed in more coordinated ones.
These empirical results are themselves new interesting evidence that the paper helps to ex-
plain. As surprising as it may be, they are broadly consistent with previous studies at the
industry level. Most of them, explore the link between regulation and economic performance by
relying on OECD regulation indicators (as in this work). Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) report
a positive interaction between product market regulation and the proximity to the technology
frontier in a model explaining multifactor productivity growth. While the authors interpret
their nding as a negative e¤ect of regulation on the catching-up process, it also implies that
the impact of regulation on productivity growth positively increases with the proximity to the
frontier. Similarly, Amable et al. (2009) nd no evidence of a negative e¤ect of regulation on
innovative performance close to the technology frontier. After several robustness checks, what
remains is that the marginal e¤ect of regulation on innovation tends to be positive at the lead-
ing edge.3 Inklaar et al. (2007) analyse several sources of multifactor productivity growth in
service sectors. Excepting telecommunications, their results fail to show a robust negative e¤ect
of market barriers indicators on productivity growth. On the other hand, Arnold et al. (2008)
2The Economist in the title of the printed article of May 1st 2008 reects the non-trivial link between regulation
and competition: "Oceans Apart: Europe still seems to have less faith than America in the ability of the free
market to tame monopolies".
3These industry-level works contradict micro-level results found by Aghion et al. (2005) for a panel of UK
rms using protability-based measures of competition. The inverted-U shape pattern between competition and
innovation, that underlies Aghion et al.s (2005) claim, has also been empirically relativised at the micro-level
by Tingvall and Poldahl (2006). A number of theoretical arguments, dealing with strategic behaviour, can be
mentioned to explain the lack of clear-cut results on this matter (see for instance Etro 2007, Chapter 4; Tishler
and Milstrein, 2009; Amable et al. 2009;)
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do report that regulation induce a negative e¤ect on rm productivity, but only in ICT-using
industries. Among them, their sample considers several service sectors which are not present in
the manufacturing sample used in this paper. Gri¢ th et al. (2006) investigate the e¤ect of the
Single Market Programme (SMP) on R&D expenditure. Di¤erently from the previously men-
tioned empirical works, the authors construct indirect indicators of market regulation through
a step function that, basically speaking, seeks to measure the expected exposition to the SMP.
Protability e¤ects of regulation are isolated following a two-step methodology. Results are
that the liberalisation trend induced by the SMP is positively correlated with R&D investment.
However, in line with the results presented in the present work, in several of R&D reduced-form
regressions (i.e. including other chanels than protability) and also in some of the robustness
check TFP regression, the group of industries related to the catgeory of "high-tech public pro-
curement" (including telecommunications equipment, o¢ ce machinery and medical and surgical
equipment) presents a signicantly negative correlation, that is to say, a negative impact of
deregulation on R&D and productivity.4
The theoretical explanation proposed by the paper brings some standard developments of
industrial organisation (IO) into a quality-ladders growth setting. Whilst strategic entry deter-
rence and preemption in R&D races have been deeply analysed in IO works they have received
much less attention in Schumpeterian growth models until recently.5 Some exemples include ex-
plicitly defensive behaviour of incumbents such as the introduction of tacitness in the knowledge
embodied in production techniques in order to prevent leapfrogging (Thoenig and Verdier, 2003)
or the engagement in patent blocking, intelectual property disputes and the like to delay their
replacement (Dinopoulos and Syropoulos, 2007). In such papers rms play simultaneously in a
Nash-Cournot equilibrium and have symmetric technologies in R&D. These assumptions imply
that Arrow replacement e¤ect holds and leaders do not continue to innovate. There is however,
convincing evidence about the active rôle of leaders in R&D (see for instance Chandler, 1990;
Malerba et al., 1997). In the proposed model, the participation of the leader in R&D contests
arises endogenously.
The circumstances under which the Arrow e¤ect vanishes has also been addressed in early in-
4Other related evidence is that provided by macro-institutional literature emphasising the diversity of capi-
talism (Albert, 1991, Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003). Di¤erent institutionals congurations are able to
deliver economic performance. In some of them, market-based forces ensured by a deregulated environment are
the key dynamic engine, in other it is rather institutional coordination and welfare state that are associated to
economic performance. The evidence provided later is broadly compatible with this line of research.
5Bain (1949), Williamson, (1963), Salop (1977), Dasgupta et al. (1982), Gilbert and Newberry (1982) and
Reinganum (1983) are some early exemples of IO works.
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uent models of patent races but only recently spanned into quality-ladders literature.6 This de-
ne a special class of models able to reproduce innovative leaders. This can be done, for instance,
thanks to the assumption of exogenous R&D advantages either within Nash-Cournot equilibri-
ums and decreasing returns in R&D technology (Segerstrom and Zolnierek, 1999; Segerstrom,
2007) or within a Stackelberg type game (Etro, 2007 & 2008) that can be represented in a
simple version with constant returns in R&D (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004-Chapter 7). These
works, however, consider innovation contests where the asymmetry betwen the R&D technology
of the leader and that of the follower is exogenous. The explanation proposed here links these
models with the above mentioned category by reproducing endogenous relative R&D advantages
of leaders through defensive strategies. Introducing a stage in which R&D asymmetries can be
acquired renders more sounding the rst move advantage game.7
Similar strategic issues has been recently analysed by Grossman and Steger (2008). They
show, that from the leaders point of view, the erection of entry barriers and R&D are comple-
mentary activities. Despite entry blocking, this behaviour can be conductive to positive growth
e¤ects when outsidersR&D do not generate knowledge spillovers. Important di¤erences exist
between their model and the one presented in this paper: Cournot versus Bertrand competition
here, deterministic innovation versus risky R&D investment here, a rather static entry bar-
rier construction versus path dependency here (among others). This makes comparisons hard.
Their results are, however, compatible with the equilibrium with permantent monopolist. Over-
all, what should be kept in mind is that, rather than render the analysis ambiguous, the richness
of IO tools provides a highly selective level of robustness scrutiny. It is then not surprising to
conclude that the relationship between competition and innovation remains an open question.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 the
empirical ndings. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 4. In order to keep the
exposition simple, most of technical developments is presented in appendix.
6For patent races works, see for instance the interesting discrepancies between Gilbert and Newberry (1982)
and Reinganum (1983).
7An alternative line of argument is that of Denicolò (2001). If innovation is non-radical, the gap in the industry
can be such that the leader may practice a monopolist price while the next competitive outsider engage in Bertrand
competition with consequently lower incitations. As knowledge spillovers, specially in high-technology industries,
may constrain the sustainable technology gap between rms, the explanation of R&D advantages is put forward
in the present work. Even if small, these R&D cost advantages justify that the leader continuously invests in
R&D (Klette and Griliches, 2000).
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2 The model
For the sake of simplicity, the formal setting is based on a semi-endogenous quality-ladders
model without scale e¤ects. The basic setup is based on Li (2003) which generalises Segerstroms
(1998) framework. It considers imperfect inter-industry substitutability and remove steady state
scale e¤ects by assuming that, as quality improves, new discoveries need more R&D e¤ort. At
equilibrium the innovation rate will not depend on the size of labour allocated to R&D but on
the rate of population growth.8
Section 2.1 begins presenting the rationale of the model, 2.2 follows with the basic setup
of consumption and production. The core of the setting is then presented: the strategic use
of private knowledge and capabilities (Sections 2.3 and 2.4) and the e¤ects on aggregate R&D
e¤ort at equilibrium (Section 2.5).
2.1 The model in words
The model consists of two main ingredients: (i) an endogenous choice of technological bias and
(ii) a Stackelberg type game in which the leader has the rst mover advantage. Through a
vectorial representation, the leader (i.e. the new succesful innovator) is assumed to chose its
level of R&D investment but also the specic quality mix to be introduced into the market.
By changing the latter, the new incumbent introduces a "technological bias" in the direction
of the innovation path and obtains R&D cost advantages that are crucial in the Stackelberg
game. Challengers are compelled to provide a new business solution in the context of several
disadvantages concerning learning, experience, lead time developing, lack of codication, etc.
(for short knowledge ) as well as unfavourable conditions related to the need of new manufac-
turing complementarities, patents and licenses, agency and organisational issues, market access,
etc.(for short capabilities).9 The leader, by carefully choosing the specic charcateristic of the
good, exploits these assymetries in knowledge and capababilities.10
8This feature characterises a second wave of quality-ladders models that solve problems of scale e¤ects in the
steady state growth (Segerstrom, 1998; Young, 1998), a property strongly contradicting empirical evidence found
by Jones (1995): while resources allocated to R&D increase exponentially in the long-run data, productivity growth
remains almost constant. For a survey on the evolution of this type of schumpeterian models see Dinopoulos and
Sener (2007).
9For instance, Intel Inside has recently incorporated the hafnium, a new material allowing to concentrate more
transistors into their microchips (45 nm processors) . This requires investments in manufacturing adaptations
that give the upper-hand of Intel over its rivals.
10Simulating a model of management search, Rivking (2001) shows that complexity can account for the di¤erence
between replication and imitation. At certain level of complexity, neither low nor high, the incumbent is able to
replicate a succesfull strategy within the boundaries of the rm with much less di¢ culties than its competitors
can imitate it.
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Regulation is usually modeled as a xed entry cost without other consequence than the
misallocation of ressources. Here, product market regulation increases the cost of technological
bias. This cost of course negatively inuences the leader rm value at the entry. However,
it has consequences on the properties of the new good and as such, it indirectly acts as a
knowledge codication device. Not only antidumping measures might do this job, but also
other regulatory provision that might look like product market barriers (certications, licences,
product limitations, quality controls and the like).
The Stackelberg building block closely follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). Outsiders
can be driven away from R&D races if the leader makes a commitment of high R&D investment.
The credibility of this commitment relies on the (acquired) leaders technological advantages,
constrained inne by regulation. Thus, the model yields a threshold that denes who innovates.
If the leader rm is not credible, the Arrow replacement e¤ect holds in the usual way: outsiders
have more R&D incentives than incumbents, because the latter must replace themselves. As a
consequence, potential entrants carry out all R&D e¤ort and an steady state equilibrium with
continuous Schumpeterian replacement (SR) takes place. In such equilibrium, the technological
bias helps the incumbent to delay its ending date. On the contrary, if the leader rm can make
a credible commitment, it will do all R&D and will remain in the market indenitely in the
context of a permanent monopolist (PM) equilibrium.
Each equilibrium accounts for a di¤erent e¤ect of regulation. In the SR equilibrium, regula-
tion increases the share of labour allocated to R&D because it limits entry deterrence. Its e¤ect,
however, depends positively on the size of the innovative steps as it represents a monopolistic
premium modulating R&D incentives. On the contrary, in the PM equilibrium if regulation
increases it reduces R&D intensity. The reason is that, within this equilibrium regulation con-
sumes more labour for defensive purposes without creating enough incentives for outsidersR&D
investment.
2.2 Consumption and production
2.2.1 Consumption: instantaneous decisions
Per capita utility at each time t is given by the CES formulation:
u (t) =
24 1Z
0
z (t; !)
 1

d!
35

 1
(1)
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z (t; !)  Pj jd (j; t; !) is the sub-utility function associated to each industry !. The
demand for the good of quality j at time t in industry ! is denoted by d (j; t; !). The term j
captures the quality level j of a given good, where  > 1 is a parameter representing the size of
quality upgrade. Thus, within a given industry consumers preferences are ordered by the quality
of the available varieties. To avoid confusions in notation, all round brackets, () ; are reserved
to the arguments of the functions of the model.
At any time, households allocate their consumption expenditure E (t) seeking to maximise
u (t). This static problem can be separated in two components: a within-industry consumption
decision and a between-industry one. Giving the utility function z (t; !) for the quality varieties
in each industry !, all intra-industry expenditure will focus on the good j having the lowest
quality-adjusted price: j = argmin
(j)

p(j ;t;!)
j

:
The between-industry problem concerns the allocation of total expenditure E (t) among all
! 2 [0; 1]. This consists of applying the optimal intra-industry demand z (t; !) = d (j; t; !)
to (1) and maximising u (t) subject to
1Z
0
p (j; t; !) d (j; t; !) d! = E(t), which leads to the
well-known CES demands:
d (j; t; !) =
 (j; t; !)
p (j; t; !)
1R
0
(j;t;!0)
p(j;t;!0)1 
d!0
E(t) (2)
Where  (j; t; !)  j[ 1] is a quality level index.
2.2.2 Consumption: intertemporal decisions
Households are identical dynastic families whose number of members grows at the exogenous
rate n > 0. Each member of a household supplies inelastically one unit of labour. Without loss
of generality, initial population is set to 1, so that the population at time t is L(t) = ent. Using
a subjective discount rate  > n; each dynastic family maximises its intertemporal utility
U =
1Z
0
e [ n]t log u (t) dt (3)
subject to

a (t) = w (t) + r (t) a (t)  E (t)  na (t)
Where the intertemporal budget constraint links stock market gains, revenue and expendi-
ture. a (t) is the endowment of per capita assets. Its variation

a (t) is decomposed into current
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wage income of the representative household member w (t) plus stock market gains r (t) a (t)
minus expenditure E (t). Between t and dt, the growth of per capita assets needs to be adjusted
by population growth n. Observe that u (t) = E(t)P ; where P =

1R
0
h
p(j;t;!0)
j

i1 
d!0
 1
1 
is
the utility-based price index. Since P is taking as given, the problem is equivalent to maximise
U =
1Z
0
e ( n)t logE (t) dt subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. Solving this program
leads to the well-known intertemporal optimal rule:

E (t)
E (t)
= r (t)   (4)
2.2.3 Producers and price setting
Labour is the only factor in production and is used in a technology with constant returns to
scale. Each rm producing the variety ! sells its output to all members of the representative
household. Thus, the rm produces a quantity of d (j; t; !)L (t) ; sells at price p (j; t; !) and
incurs a production cost w (t) d (j; t; !)L (t). After wage normalisation, w (t) = 1; the prot of
each producer is given by:
 (j; t; !) = [p (j; t; !)  1] d (j; t; !)L (t) (5)
Standard monopolist prot maximisation would lead to a markup over marginal costs:
p (j; t; !) =  1 . However, the monopolist is also in competition with rms o¤ering lower
quality goods. Bertrand competition yields to a limit pricing behaviour. Consider, namely, a
rm laying one step behind the leader in the quality-ladder and whose best quality-adjusted
price is p(j
 1;!;t)
j
 1 =
1
j
 1 (i.e. its price equals its marginal cost). The leader rm will then
charge p (j; !; t) =  and get all demands.11
The application of this intra-industry price setting will depend on the size of innovation 
and the monopolist power  1 . If

 1 >  rms will charge p (j
; !; t) = . On the contrary, if

 1   the leader is unconstrained to charge its optimal monopolistic price rule p (j; t; !) =

 1 . This introduces the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 Price setting is constrained by potential entry


 1 > 

, so that p (j; !; t) =
p = :
11A tie-break rule assumption, stating that a consumer facing similar quality-adjusted prices prefers the good
with the highest quality, allows to avoid the use of a quality-adjusted price innitesimally lower.
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Assumption 2 Knowledge spillovers are such that any time an innovative rm succeeds,
the previous version of the good is available for the rest of rms.
The model works with further quality upgrades of the same good. In this sense, it is more
plausible to suppose, as in Assumption 1, that the size of each upgrade is not big enough to
induce the innovator to adopt the same price behaviour than a monopolist having no outside
competition. Assumption 2 implies that there always be a rm one step down so that the only
possible price setting is this bounded limit price.12
Putting demands (2) into leader prots (5) and using the fact that p neither depends on j
nor on ! yields:
 (j; !; t) =
[p  1]
p
 (j; !; t)
Q (t)
E (t)L (t) (6)
Where Q (t) 
1R
0
 (j; !; t) d! =
1R
0
j
[ 1]d! is the average quality index. Thus, the monop-
olistic competition framework implies that rms compete in quality with the whole economy.
2.3 R&D technologies and quality improvements
At each state-of-the-art quality level j; the successful innovator of the current R&D race improves
quality to the level j + 1 and climbs the quality-ladder one step up.13 The above-exposed price
setting implies that the successful innovator becomes the sole producer in the industry. Thus,
each incumbent is also the monopolist and the leader of the industry. Di¤erently from the
standard setup, in this model the incumbent does not wait until the next innovator "steals"
its rents, but seeks to deter its potential rivals and to remain in the market. This section is
devoted to set the underlying R&D framework allowing for these mechanisms. Before starting
a subscript simplication can be made.
Subscript simplication Observe that: (i) there is only one rm producing a positive
quantity in an industry; (ii) the only di¤erence among industries concerning state variables is
the current state-of-the-art quality level j; and (iii) all endogenous variables depend on t (except
prices). Based on (i) and (ii), j! will now summarise the couple (j; !) ; which indicates the
12Further consequences of this assumption are discussed in section 2.4.1.
13Within a symmetric equilibrium, it is usually supposed that, at t = 0, the state-of-the-art quality in each
industry is j = 0 and that some producer has the knowledge to fabricate a good of quality j = 0: Firms then
engage in R&D races to discover a new version of the good.
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current state-of-the-art good produced by the leader of industry !. Thanks to (iii) the time
index can be dropped, keeping in mind the time dependency of the model.
2.3.1 Quality dimensions
The quality provided by a rm producing in industry ! is given by the quality vector  !q (j!) =
fq1 (j!) ; q2 (j!) :::; qm (j!)g . These m dimensions concern not only the fabricated good but also
the whole business process involved in the provision of the good to the customer and related
services (i.e. the integrated supply chain). The magnitude (level) of quality is summarised by
the euclidean norm of the vector k !q (j!)k =
s
mP
k=1
q2k (j!) and the quality mix by its direction
(the angle of the vector), which reect the composition of the o¤ered good. In line with the
intra-industry sub-utility function, di¤erent mix concerning the same industry and quality level
are also perfect substitutable versions of the same product. In each industry, two di¤erent
quality mix provide the same utility if their magnitude is equal. Direction only matters in the
research sector.
The quality state j! is the outcome of step-by-step innovations. The magnitude of the quality
vector is upgraded at each step by a factor of ; the size of innovations. The quality provided
by the state-of-the-art j! is thus dened as k !q (j!)k = j! :
2.3.2 R&D technologies
The denition of R&D technologies is based on two assumptions:
Assumption 3. While outsiders competing in a R&D race take the current quality mix as
given, the current successful innovator can change it.
Assumption 4. Outsiders take a time to acquire the knowledge and capabilities to introduce
a new dimension of quality into the new state-of-the-art product.
Assumption 3 reects the innovators advantages arising from its private knowledge about
the new product. Once the new discovery come o¤, the new blueprint is certainly known by the
innovator. The leader rm now has the choice about what visible properties its product and
related services will have in the market. Assumption 4, implies that outsiders need to develop
additional knowledge and capabilities to be able to replicate and improve the current state-of-art
knowledge.14
14 In a basic quality-ladders framework, outsiders "via inspection of goods on the market, learn enough about the
11
OutsidersR&D technology Outsiders carry out R&D activities by using labour as input.
R&D is governed by a Poisson stochastic process: `i units of labour allocated to research during
an interval of time dt imply a probability of success 0 (j! + 1) `idt of a new upgrade. The R&D
productivity is the augmenting factor of the probability of innovative success implied by one
unit of labour in the R&D process. For the outsider, the R&D productivity is dened as
0 (j! + 1)  h cos
 j!
 (j! + 1)
Following Li (2003), this R&D productivity is a function of the upgrade endeavoured (j! + 1).
The presence of the quality index  (j! + 1) = [j!+1][ 1] represents the idea that, as the level
of quality increases, the next improvement becomes harder and R&D more costly. h is an
exogenous technological parameter of R&D e¢ ciency.
The incidence of the quality mix on R&D is captured by the normalised scalar product
between the current and the previous quality vector (i.e. between  !q (j!) and  !q (j!   1)),
which is completely dened by the angle j! between both vectors. That is to say:
 !q (j!) !q (j!   1)
k !q (j!)k k !q (j!   1)k = cos j!
Recall that the cos () function is symmetric and monotonically decreases from 1 to 0 along
with jj! j 2 [0; =2[ (in  radians). Hence, a change in the quality mix at quality state j! (i.e.
j!) increases the R&D di¢ culty faced by outsiders by a factor cos
 j! , where  > 0 captures
the impact of the thecnological bias. The instantaneous probability of innovation Ii implied by
the R&D e¤ort of outsider i is then:
Ii = `i
h cos j!
 (j! + 1)
(7)
The advantage of using a vectorial representation of quality is that, between two wave of
innovations, quality dimensions need not be specied. Between the previous and the current
version of the product, represented by two vectors of Rn; all the information needed is the
angle between them. The e¤ect of technological bias collapses to the scalar product among both
vectors.
state of knowledge to mount their own research e¤orts, even if the patent laws (or the lack of complete knowledge
about best production methods) prevent them from manufacturing the current generation products" (Grossman and
Helpman, 1991 p. 47). The "lack of complete knowledge" can be related to the way in which a new mix of quality
must be incorporated into the new good, as well as the need of solutions to overcome the barrier constructed by
the incumbent.
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Leaders R&D technology The leader rm does not face the di¢ culty coming from bias. It
has discovered the current state-of-the-art product and it is the sole producer that knows how
to incorporate the new dimension in the manufacturing of the good. Hence, the leaders R&D
productivity is:
L (j! + 1) =
h
 (j! + 1)
2.3.3 The path of innovation and regulation
As a way to protect their position, the innovator can add a new quality dimension to the cur-
rent mix in order to introduce a bias in the path of innovation. The model assumes that the
discovery enables the innovator to incorporate some new component or process that exploit its
asymmetries in knowledge and capabilities. This new dimension can include, for instance, new
services, bundling, specic intermediate inputs, manufacturing installations, property rights,
market access, vertical integrations, etc. introduced with the aim to take advantage from their
complementary assets, know-how and technology. It can also be the "re-discovery" of a tradi-
tional dimension that have been dropped in the previous version of the good and for which the
way to be included in the new version is by no means widely feasible because of compatibility
issues or/and licensing contracting.15
Figure 1 illustrates the path of innovation. Let us start from the quality level j in a given
industry. At this stage thee good is totally based on dimension q1 (implying a horizontal vector).
Once the next innovative rm has succeeded in upgrading the quality level to j+1; it introduces
a bias by including dimension q2: The rm then produces the new version of the product with a
quality vector having a direction j+1 far away from the previous one. By doing so, it increases
the di¢ culty of the next R&D race (the one leading to the j + 2 level) by a factor of cos j+1:
Then, the next innovation occurs and improves the quality level to j + 2 and do the same:
Since at each discovery new dimensions are available, this process may last indenitely. The
gure suggests a case for "re-discovery" of quality dimensions. The new mix at stage j + 2 lies
completely on the plan q2 and q3: Dimension q1 has been dropped (q1 (j + 2) = 0). If some com-
patibility concern arises after one step, the next incumbent ( the winner of the j + 3th contest)
can use again the quality dimension q1 as a source of bias.
15Think for instance in Dolby audio technology compatible with i-Pods or, even, in the o¤er of organic ice
creams in fast-foods. On licencing-out market imperfections see Guellec and Zuñigas (2009) survey analysis.
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Figure 1. Innovation Path
Any leader that changes the mix incurs a variable cost (in units of labour) of adapting the
new version. This cost is dened through the following functional form :
c (j! ;  ) 
f
cos j!L (j!)
(8)
where  >  summarises the extent to which product market regulation limits the new version
of the product. Regulation implies a cost of technological bias that increases with the change of
the direction of the quality vector. Thus, in this illustration regulatory provisions are modeled
as limiting complexity in the manufactured version of the improved product. The assumption
 >  means that regulation is supposed to be e¤ective in limiting the new incumbent.
The cost of introducing a technological bias in the new product diminishes with the R&D
productivity involved in its discovery. This captured by the term L (j!) : the R&D productivity
of the leader rm in the former R&D race j! (the one that it has won). The presence of
L (j!) also implies that higher quality goods are more di¢ cult "to bias" since R&D productivity
decreases with the quality level of the industry. This rather realistic assumption helps to simplify
the dynamics of j! . Finally, a cost parameter f is included to take into account the measure
of units of labour required to activities relating to defensive strategies.
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2.4 Strategic behaviour
2.4.1 Stochastic jumps and timing
If researchers of an outsider rm i succeed, the rm get a value denoted by vL (j! + 1) : Free entry
in the research sector implies that rms enter up to the point where the expected value of inno-
vation, vL (j! + 1)o (j! + 1) `iodt; equates the R&D e¤ort `io invested during the innitesimal
interval of time dt. That is to say :
vL (j! + 1) =
1
o (j! + 1)
(9)
Given the CRS in R&D technology, the R&D e¤ort of the outsider for a given value of a
successful innovation vL (j! + 1) is then:
`io =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if vL (j! + 1) <
1
o(j!+1)
1 if vL (j! + 1) > 1o(j!+1)
`io 2 R+ if vL (j! + 1) = 1o(j!+1)
(10)
Let `0 =
P
i `i0 be the total amount of R&D carried out by outsiders. The Bellman equation
of a (potential) innovative leader can be written as
rvL (j!) = L   `L + `LL (j! + 1) [vL (j! + 1)  vL (j!)] (11)
 `oo (j! + 1) vL (j!)  c (j! ;  )
If the leader invests `L in R&D, with instantaneous probability `LL (j! + 1) its optimal
value vL (j!) can jump to vL (j! + 1) thanks to the new discovery. With instantaneous proba-
bility `oo (j! + 1) the leader may be replaced by a successful outsider. In the meantime, the
leader rm enjoys its monopolist prots L and pays `L unit of labour for new discoveries as
well as c (j! ;  ) units of labour for defensive strategies.
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Assumption 2 implies that the maximum gap attained is one step. Therefore, an asymmetry
in price setting incitations will not arise here. Even if the leader innovates it will not get enough
technological distance to practice a monopolistic price that would give him more incentives to
innovate compared to an outsider that must charge a Bertrand price when innovations are non-
16Equation (11) implicitly says that the current value of a follower is zero. This is the result of Bertrand
competition, the free entry condition with CRS and zero R&D sunk cost to be payed before playing.
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radical (see Denicolò, 2001). This assumption allows to focus, by construction, on incitations
stemming from R&D advantages.
Built on this setting, the timing of the model is as follows:
1. Nature : At the very beginning of the technological state j!, the nature provides the leader
(the current successful innovator), symmetric R&D technologies and the parameters of the
model, namely the level of regulation. Free entry in the research sector applies.
2. Entry into the product market : the leader chooses the level of bias j! in order to maximise
its value. It takes the parameters of the model as given, namely the level of product market
regulation. Production starts.
3. R&D race :
(a) The leader decides its optimal level of R&D e¤ort `L taking j! as xed and knowing
outsiders reaction (10)
(b) Having observed the leaders commitment `L, outsiders set their optimal R&D e¤ort
`o
Once investments are engaged, they remain xed during the contest. Namely, the leader
cannot change its choice of j! . The ow cost c (j! ;  ) can then be seen as the amortised
defensive investment per-time interval dt. Stage 3 is the core of the Stackelberg game based on
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) model. A key di¤erence is that the relative cost advantages are
endogenous thanks to stage 2.
2.4.2 The Stackelberg game
The following proposition establishes the conditions under which outsiders are deterred. The
presentation focuses on the case where j! =  is constant. In section 2.3.3, this will prove to be
true for a constant outsider menace, which is the standard steady state condition of this kind of
model.
Proposition 1 For a constant value of j! = ; a su¢ cient condition to ensure a non protable
R&D e¤ort for outsiders is
cos  
h
1   [ 1]
i
(12)
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Under this condition, the leaders R&D e¤ort can be positive and irrespective of outsider
actions. In this equilibrium the leader value and the interest rate verify, respectively
vL (j!) =
L   c (;  )
r
(13)
r =
p  1
p
E L

1   [ 1]h
Q
(14)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
The inequality stated in (12) will be referred to as the credibility condition. Intuitively,
it denes a threshold for the R&D productivity advantage of the leader

L(j!+1)
o(j!+1)
= 1
cos 

;
which is increasing in  (i.e. decreasing in cos ). This threshold determines whether the
R&D investment is protable for the leader rm (i.e. whether it is credible). If this is the
case, constant returns of R&D investment imply that the leader can potentially perform enough
R&D e¤ort to put outsiders out of competition. Thus, when the bias is strong enough, the
leader does carries out research e¤ort and the outcome is that the value of the next quality
improvement is lower than the R&D cost incurred by outsiders vL (j! + 1) < 1o(j!+1) (see the
proof of Proposition 1 for details). As a consequence, outsiders react by setting zero R&D e¤ort,
meaning no replacement menace: Io =
P
i Iio = 0. In this case the leader value is given by (13).
In contrast, if the credibility condition does not hold, the leader will be replaced and all R&D
will be done by outsiders. Its value in such a situation is that implied by (11) for `L = 0: The
ex ante value of the incumbent can be summed up as:
vL (j!) =
8><>:
L c(; )
r+`oo(j!+1)
if cos  >

1   [ 1] (a)
L c(; )
r if cos
   1   [ 1] (b) (15)
2.4.3 The choice of the bias
At the moment in which the leader enters into the product market (i.e. when it introduces the
new good), outsiders can potentially carry out research e¤orts and the free entry condition in
the research sector holds. Thus, the rationale of the decision of bias starts by considering that,
at this stage, no technological advantage has been acquired. The leader rm is not credible for
the moment and its value is given by (15,a). Potentially, a new successful innovator can replace
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it. But the leader can make this task harder. A higher R&D di¢ culty means a lower probability
of replacement and then a higher expected value. This decision of bias implies a cost of c (j! ;  )
units of labour which is increasing in  , the regulation parameter. The leader rm will choose
a value of j!that maximises its value.
Dene IoL  `oL (j! + 1) as the potential menace of outsiders, that is the probability of
outsiders innovative success in the absence of any bias (i.e. when j! = 0). The Bellman
equation of the leader before its credibility has been acquired can be then written as:
rvL (j!) = L   IoL cos j!vL (j!)  c (j! ; ) (16)
Proposition 2 When free entry in the research sector holds, there exists an optimal choice
of bias if its impact () is high enough. Its value is constant for a constant potential outsider
menace (IoL) and is given by
cos  =

 f
IoL
 1
 
(17)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2.
As expected cos  decreases with IoL: A higher potential menace of replacement implies a
more aggressive defensive strategy. Moreover, for a given value of IoL regulation reduces the
bias:17 Recalling that outsiders (de facto) probability of R&D success is Io = IoL cos ; one
easily veries:
Io = I
  
 
oL

 f

 
 
(18)
This hazard rate converges toward its potential Io ! IoLwhen  ! 1. Hence, a high level
of regulation may (asymptotically) eliminate the bias (cos  ! 1).
In particular,  can determine whether the credibility condition holds. For a low enough
level of regulation, the bias delivers credibility. In that case the economy jumps to a permanent
monopolist framework with an innovative leader whose value is that of equation (15,b). The
choice of  in this limit case is established by Proposition 3.
17Taking IoL as given, @ cos @ = cos 

1 log[cos ]
 2

> 0 since log

cos 

< 0:
18
Proposition 3 When the leader credibility is ensured, the optimal value of bias is
cos  =
h
1   [ 1]
i
(19)
Proof. It follows immediately from (15,b).
Here the incumbent enjoys permanent prots as an innovative monopolist. Once this domi-
nant position has been achieved, higher level of bias will only increase costs without additional
value. Therefore, the leader does not need further R&D advantages beyond the credibility point.
Thus, two type of equilibriums can arise. In the rst case, outsiders do all R&D and the
leader delays its replacement in a Schumpeterian replacement equilibrium (SR). In the second
situation, the leader may become the sole innovator enjoying permanent prots in a Permanent
monopolistic equilibrium (PM). To identify the underlying conditions of each type of equilib-
rium, the schedule of decisions studied so far needs to be completed with the macro steady-state
analysis. This is what the next section does.
2.5 Global accounting and steady state
Given the semi-endogenous nature of the innovation rate, the anlysis here consists in identifying
the potential menace of ousiders that underlies the de facto innovation rate at equilibirum. Since
this menace trigger the defensive reaction of the leader, whe then analyse how regulation a¤ects
the choice of the leader at equilibirum and, thereby, the steady-state equilibrium itself.
2.5.1 The Schumpeterian replacement equilibrium
The macro equilibrium for a continuum Schumpeterian replacement is given by the fulllment
of the labour market clearing and the free entry condition in the research sector. Labour
market clearing under full employment needs the addition of labour used in research Lr =
1R
0
`o (j! + 1) d!, manufacturing Ly =
1R
0
L d (j!) d! and defensive activities related to technolog-
ical bias Lf =
1R
0
c (; ) d!. The focus here is the symmetric steady state equilibrium in which
expenditure E and outsiders innovation rate I0 are constant. The latter implies that I0L is also
constant and so cos . Using the denition of the average quality index Q introduced in equation
(6) and the quality index of each industry  (j! + 1) = [j!+1][ 1], the demand for labour in
research activities is given by:
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Lr =
Io
 1
h cos 
Q (20)
After including demand equation (2), labour required for manufacturing is:
Ly = L
E
p
To obtain the labour demand for defensive activities, the denition of c (; ) in (8) and the
average quality index are used to obtain 18:
Lf =
f
h cos 
Q
The full employment condition requires that L = Ly + Lr + Lf , which is equivalent to:
1 =
E
p
+
Io
 1
h cos 
Q
L
+
f
h cos 
Q
L
(21)
To include the free entry, the rm value of the replacement case (15,a) is substituted on the
RHS of (9) and the outsidersR&D productivity for constant values of IoL and cos  on the LHS.
In addition, equation (4) must be veried at

E
E = 0 , so that r = :
E =
Q
L
p
p  1

+ I0
h cos 
+
f
h cos 

(22)
Clearly, in a steady-state equilibrium in which IoL and E are constant, x  QL must also be
constant. Hence, population and average quality must grow at the same rate:

Q
Q
=

L
L
= n (23)
Therefore, the model builds on the same tractable properties of a standard semi-endogenous
growth model without scale e¤ects.19 The rate of growth of Q is obtained in the usual way.
Using the law of large numbers, the variation of average quality is computed by adding the
expected technological jump of each industry:

Q =
1R
0
Io [ (j! + 1)   (j!)] d!. After using the
denition of Q, this expression reduces to:
18Because industries are symmetric in probabilities, cos  (which depends on I0L) can be considered as a
constant inside integrals.
19After putting demands (2) into the instantaneous utility (1), taking logs and di¤erencing, the growth of the
average quality implies the standard steady-state utility growth

u(t)
u(t)
= n
 1 :
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
Q
Q
= Io

 1   1
In steady state, condition (23) must hold. Thus, the innovation rate is:
Io =
n
[ 1   1] (24)
Using this result and equation (18), the consequent steady-state potential menace of outsiders
is:
IoL =
2664 n
[ 1   1]
h
 f

i 
 
3775
 
  
(25)
The technological bias in steady-state in the SR equilibrium is obtained by putting (25) into
(17), which leads to:
cos  =
"
 1   1 f
n
# 
  
(26)
The steady-state level of bias keeps the property of the partial equilibrium decision: when
 ! 1 the bias vanishes (cos  ! 1). By constraining the possibilities of bias, regulation  
is at the core of the jump from continuous rm renewal (the SR equilibrium) to a permanent
leadership (the PM one). This result is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 For  >  there exists a unique level of regulation
 
 

dening the threshold
between the Schumpeterian replacement and the permanent monopolist cases involved in the value
of the leader rm (15).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
Figure 2 illustrates the steady-state decision of bias given the value of regulation. For
 2 1;   the bias is set following equation (19). Thereafter, the leader must take into account
free entry of outsiders and decides accordingly to 26).
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Figure 2. Leaders optimal choice of bias
The e¤ect of regulation on R&D e¤ort in steady-state can be analysed through the share of
labour allocated to research sr  LrL . This share can be obtained from the system of equations
(21) and (22) for two unknowns: x  QL and E . Solving this system for x and using Lr as
expressed by (20) gives:
sr =
1
 rep +
p
 1[p 1] 
(27)
Where  rep  1 + [1 
 [ 1]]
[p 1]n +
1
 1[p 1] : The following proposition can now be stated.
Proposition 5 In the Schumpeterian equilibrium, regulation ( ) increases the labour share
allocated to R&D (sr) and its e¤ect is all the more important that the size of innovation () is
bigger.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.4.
As R&D becomes harder, at equilibrium, less rms will be willing to enter the R&D race.
The aggregate labour allocated to R&D then decreases. The size of innovation increases mar-
ginal revenues as well as the cost of climbing the quality-ladder in the next R&D race. Both
Schumpeterian channels combine to modulate the R&D incentives stemming from bias reduc-
tions. For p = , the multiplicative factor of  in (27) is increasing in : the e¤ect of regulation
is positively conditioned by the size of innovation (see the appendix for a formal proof).
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2.5.2 The permanent monopolist equilibrium
In a situation with a permanent monopolist, the free entry condition in the research sector no
longer holds. Instead, the steady-state equilibrium condition is given by the interest rate (14)
that allows a positive and nite amount of research. In this equilibrium some minor adaptations
for labour market clearing must be considered. First, the monopolist allocate labour to research
without being a¤ected by the bias. Its probability of innovative success is then IL = `LL.
Second, the optimal choice of bias is now given by cos  =

1   [ 1]. Full employment
requires:
1 =
E
p
+
IL
 1
h
Q
L
+
f
h

1   [ 1]  QL (28)
As before, if expenditure and innovation rates are constant, then

Q
Q =

L
L = n: Thus the
steady-state rate of innovation remains the same: IL = n[ 1 1] .
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Putting the interest rate (14) into the optimal path of expenditure (4) implies:
E =

1   [ 1]h QL pp  1 (29)
The steady-state share of labour allocated to R&D srm = LrL for the permanent monopolistic
case can be obtained by substituting E; as dened by (29), into labour market clearing (28) for
IL at the steady state. This yields:
srm =
1"
 per +
f
n[1  ( 1)]
 

 1
# (30)
Where  per  1 + n[p 1] .
Proposition 6 In the permanent monopolist equilibrium, regulation ( ) reduces the share of
labour allocated to R&D (srm).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.5.
In this equilibrium the monopolist is the innovator. If regulation increases, but not enough
to ensure a continuous monopolistic replacement, resources that potentially can by employed in
20Since E is constant, consumption growth is still given by

u(t)
u(t)
= n
 1 :
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R&D must be allocated for defensive activities. The R&D e¤ort then decreases.
3 Evidence
Accordingly to the model, the reasons to expect a positive correlation between regulation re-
strictions and R&D intensity is that they set the boundaries under which the innovative activity
is conducted. Within a second best context, rather than limiting the scope for innovative im-
provements these rules may act as a market coordination device able to deliver standardisation
and knowledge di¤usion. This coordination may probably be a de facto consequence of some
practices usually seen as market barriers. This section empirically analyses this possibility at
the industry level.
3.1 Empirical strategy
Industry-level data has the advantage of exploiting heterogeneity in R&D e¤ort coming from
di¤erent competitive environments. It also captures phenomenons that are aggregate in nature,
similar to those analysed in the model. However, as it well is the case with most micro data
sets, information on potential entrants (outsiders) is not available. Therefore, it is not possible
to analyse in detail the conditions under which the SR and the PM equilibrium arise. Some
practical guidelines must be assumed in order to link the model with the data.
Notice that the outcome of zero R&D e¤ort comes from the choice of CRS in R&D, the
standard assumption used for tractability. In practice, monopolists are replaced, even if they
remain for a long period of time. Consequently, the empirical exercise starts assuming that, in
average, industries are mainly concerned with the Schumpeterian equilibrium (sections 3.3.2 and
3.3.3). Section 3.3.4 then moves one step forward in identication and study how these results
change when low- and high-regulation environments are analysed separately.
High-technology industries (HT) are assumed to make bigger innovative steps than the rest
of industries. They are dened as 30-33 ISIC Rev-3 industries. This includes the information
and communication technologies (ICT industries) and the manufacturing of medical precision
and optical instruments. The robustness check section (3.3.2) tests an alternative denition
including industries 29 (machinery and equipment) and 34 (motor vehicles ), usually seen as
using intensely ICT technologies. It is expected that the kind of innovation of HT industries
allows for relatively high monopolistic incentives. If this is true and if in average industries are
in a Schumpeterian equilibrium, the R&D incentives induced by regulation should be higher in
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HT.
Let yit be the measure of aggregate R&D e¤ort (labour share in the model) of industry i at
time t. Denoting rit the regulation proxy and HT the dummy variable identifying HT industries,
the following equation is estimated:
yit = 1 rit + 2 rit HT + 3 HT + 5xit + it (31)
where it = i + it , xit is a vector of controls (see section 3.2.2) and all continuous variables
are in natural logs. Under this specication, the marginal e¤ect of regulation can be computed
as
@E [yitjHT ]
@Rit
= 1 + 2 HT
If HT = 0 then the marginal e¤ect is 1 and reects the e¤ect of regulation on non-HT
industries. When HT = 1 the marginal e¤ect is 1 + 2 : This means that 1 is also the
e¤ect of regulation which is common to HT and non-HT industries. Hence, 2 is the e¤ect of
regulation on R&D intensity in HT industries relative to non-HT ones.
The Schumpeterian equilibrium predicts a positive e¤ect of regulation on R&D intensity that
increases with the size of innovation. Using the full sample, a positive and signicant estimate b2
is expected. In other words, if an R&D-boosting e¤ect of regulation can be expected following
the model, it is more likely to be observed in the specicity of high technology industries. In
absolute terms, the over all e¤ect of regulation on R&D intensity in HT industries will be
given by b1 + b2. While the signicance of b2 can be obtained directly from the regressions,
for b1 + b2 the joint signicance b1+b2pbb1b1+bb2b2+2bb1b2 is required, where bab is the sample
covariance between a and b.
It is probable that a xed component in the error term is associated to each country-industry
couple. The bias produced by this unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity can be eliminated
by a within-group estimator, but at the cost of losing the information provided by b3. When
substracting the sample mean of each variable by group, the transformation of the within-group
estimator eliminate i, but also all time-invariant variables such asHT . However, the xed e¤ect
will contain the dummy HT; so that the estimates of b2 and b1 + b2 should remain consistent.
In the robustness checks, use is made of the three-steps xed-e¤ect decomposition proposed by
Plümper and Troeger (2007) that helps to handle this type of time-invariant variable when there
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are reasons to suspect individual unobserved heterogeneity.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 R&D and regulation
The data set contains information for 14 manufacturing industries across 14 OECD countries for
the period 1987-2003. R&D series are provided by the OECD ANBERD dataset. The sample
period is mainly limited by R&D data availability. The dependant variable, R&D intensity,
is measured as R&D expenditure over value added. The latter series were obtained from the
60-Industry database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC).21 Appendix
(A.2) gives a summary of the sample.
Indicators of regulation are computed by the OECD.22 Their attractiveness is that they
rely on administrative practices that are usually seen as market barriers. These practices are
collected and coded for specic areas of regulation and give the basis to compute what the
OECD calls low-level indicators. To construct aggregate indicators, a bottom-up approach is
implemented using weights that seek to reect information availability and the nested structure
of the areas included in the aggregate indicator. Four global indicators of regulation are used.
 The economy-wide indicator of product market regulation (henceforth PMR): It is com-
posed of a collection of inward- and outward-oriented indicators of market barriers reect-
ing state control, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment a the
national level. While close to regulatory practices its availability in time dimension is a
drawback. It is only available for 1998 and 2003 and has been consequently distributed
into the sample before and after 2000.23
 The Size and scope of the public enterprise sector (henceforth PMR-Public): It is an
important low-level component of PMR that captures the degree of active participation
of the state in product markets. One can expect that R&D activities and rm operation
where the State is strongly active are more restricted.
 The indicator of network sectors (henceforth ETCR): It is an indicator of regulation in
seven sectors related to energy, transport and communication (telecoms, electricity, gas,
21http://www.ggdc.net/databases/60_industry.htm
22www.oecd.org/eco/pmr
23This arbitrary distribution seeks to reect the timing of surveys and, under a xed-e¤ect specication, it
should have minor consequences on estimations.
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post, rail, air passenger transport, and road freight). It is available in times-series at the
country level and focuses on areas such as barriers to entry, public ownership, market
structure and price controls. As network sectors have been one of the main target of wider
deregulation policies, they help to capture the evolution of the competitive environment
at the national level.
 The impact of service regulation on manufacturing (henceforth REGIMP): It captures the
"knock-on" e¤ects associated to regulation in (i) network services; (ii) retail distribution
and professional business services (RBSR) and (iii) nance. Information on regulation in
retail and business services deals with barriers to entry, price controls and constrains on
business operations for 1998 and 2003. Regulation on the nancial sector stems from De
Serres et al. (2006) who provide regulatory practices on the banking system and nancial
instruments in the period 2002-2003. The projection of regulation of services sectors on
manufacturing industries is made accordingly to input/output matrices informing about
the use of these sectors as intermediates inputs. The main advantage of this indicator is
that it is available in the form of time-series cross-section data.
The details of the methodology, questionary and construction of PMR can be found in
Conway et al. (2005). The methodology and analysis related to REGIMP and ETCR is fully
documented in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). While REGIMP and ETCR are more indirect
measures of product market competition, they remain highly correlated to the PMR aggregate
indicator (78% and 64%, respectively) and have the advantage of providing information in
time series. For these reasons they will be emphasised in the presentation of the empirical
results, specially REGIMP which presents a pseudo-panel variability compatible with that of
the explained variable.
An important question is the extent to which these indicators reect the kind of regulation
described in the model. In the theoretical setting regulation is seen as a device constraining the
way in which the new discovery is introduced into the market. While the OECD indicators are
constructed with the aim of capturing practices supposed to curb competition, by denition,
they measure barriers that limit the action of actors. In this sense, REGIMP has the advantage
of capturing the restrictions induced by utility sectors (network services, retail, business services
and nance) on the provision and fabrication of manufactured goods. Domestic regulation in
these sectors will particularly shape entry and operation in manufacturing industries as they
represent key inputs, mainly produced by natural monopolies where import penetration plays a
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minor rôle. For instance, some of the practices considered by the indicators of regulation in retail
and professional services include limitations such as licensing permits, restrictions on entrepre-
neurial choices and on the type of products that can be o¤ered (see Conway and Nicoletti, 2006
Appendix). Firms that use theses services will be probably constrained in their implementation
of new business solutions. Similarly, restrictions on the furniture of communication, transports
and energy will clearly delimit the way to introduce new goods on the market.24
3.2.2 Other explanatory variables
In order to control for alternative determinants of R&D intensity, the following variables are
considered:
 R&D spillovers: as stressed by several works in endogenous growth, controlling for the
innovative e¤ort performed at the world level, helps to take into account the knowledge
externalities as well as the possible strategic complementarity in R&D investments. For
each country, industry and period these externalities are proxied by the R&D intensity
performed by the rest of countries in the same industry. As they vary in both cross-
section and time dimension, R&D spillovers are a good indicator of the evolution of the
international technological context of each individual (country-industry couple).
 Proximity to the technology frontier: The technology gap of the industry vis-à-vis the
world technology frontier can be an important determinant of innovation and, as such, of
the innovative underlying e¤ort. Industries competing close to the frontier may require
more adaptation to technological change and so more innovative e¤ort than laggards ones.
For a given period, the proximity to the technology frontier is measured as the labour
productivity of each country-industry couple relative to the highest one observed at the
world level in the same industry. In order to provide a more accurately identication of
the most productive industry, the transversal deation of value-added uses PPAs at the
industry level, provided by Timmer et al. (2007) for 1997.
 Capital intensity: Capital can be correlated to R&D e¤ort by several channels. While
it can render search routines more e¢ cient it can also be a substitute in the case of
industries that heavily rely on embodied technical change. On the other hand, because of
24Conway and Nicoletti (2006) report that in the late 1990 roughly 80% of the output of business services was
used as intermediate in other sectors of the economy and that nance, electricity, post and telecommunication
sectors accounted represented between 50%-70% of intermediate inputs in production processes.
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complementarities between high-skills and capital, these indicator may indirectly correct
for potential bias induced by the omission of variables related to human capital endowment
Capital intensity is computed as the ratio of deated capital stock (from OECD STAN)
to hours worked (GGDC). Capital stock has been obtained from cumulative investments
thanks to a perpetual-inventory rule using a 7% depreciation rate. The main drawback of
these series is the lack of availability of information for some countries, which translates
into a reduction of roughly half of the sample. Related results should be then analysed
with caution.
 Financial deepness: It is included since innovation can be constrained not by the lack
of incentives but by nancial market imperfections. Financial development is proxied by
the ratio of total asset investment of institutional investors over GDP available from the
OECD (Institutional Investor database).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 A di¤erentiated impact of regulation depending on the technological level
Table 1 reports the main results using the full sample. Within-group regressions are presented
considering Huber-White corrected standard errors. The impact of R&D spillovers (R&D in-
tensity of the rest of the world in the same industry) on R&D intensity is signicantly positive
in all specications. Indeed, this correlation appears in most of regressions. Column [1] and
[2] presents regressions using the "knock-on" e¤ect of non-manufacturing regulation on manu-
facturing activities, captured by the regulation proxy REGIMP. It represents the widest source
of variance as it is available in time-series cross-section data. Following REGIMP, regulation
does not account for a signicant e¤ect on R&D intensity in non-HT industries . However, in
line with what can be deduced from the models prediction, one observes a positive e¤ect of
regulation which is specic to HT industries. This is true in relative and absolute terms. In
relative terms this result is given by the positive and signicant coe¢ cient of the interaction
between REGIMP and the dummy variable dening high-tech industries. In absolute terms,
this positive correlation is shown by the marginal e¤ect (ME) computed in the bottom part of
Table 1. As explained above, this ME considers both (a) the e¤ect of regulation that is common
to HT and non-HT industries (b1 in equation 31) and (b) the e¤ect of regulation that is specic
to HT industries (b2 in equation 31). It could be argued that the data structure might imply
intra-group correlation. The same regressions have been run using both Huber-White correction
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of standard errors and clustering at the industry level. The table reports the clustered standard
errors for the marginal e¤ect in squared brackets. One easily veries that the signicance of the
ME is still preserved at conventional levels under this heteroskedasticity robustness check.
These results are conrmed by the regulation proxy ETCR (columns [3] and [4]) that mea-
sures regulatory provisions in network sectors. As suggested by (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006),
this indicator mirrors the trend of regulatory reforms at the national level.25 Interestingly, here,
in the basic model of column [3], regulation presents a signicantly positive correlation with
R&D intensity. As before, one the interaction is included, a di¤erentiated e¤ect appears. Both
the interaction term and the ME suggest a positive impact of regulation on HT industries. This
is also robust to the clustered correction of the standard errors.
Results are slightly di¤erent for the product market regulation proxy PMR (columns [5] and
[6]). PMR is an aggregate of economy-wide indicators aiming at capture market barriers. It
does not vary in every period. Two points in time are available. This is probably the main
reason for some changes in the estimations. Now, in the simple model (column [5]) regulation
appear to be negatively associated to R&D. This is also true for the e¤ect of regulation in non-
HT technologies in column [6]. In this regression, a positive and signicant interaction between
regulation and HT industries shows up. Hence, PMR regressions illustrate more sharply the
di¤erentiated e¤ect of regulation depending on the technological level. The sum of the positive
R&D e¤ect of regulation in HT industries and the negative one, common to all industries, yields
a non signicant overall ME.
The last two columns focus, among market barriers summarised in PMR, on the size and
the scope of the public sector (PMR-Public). One should expect that a higher and active state
imposes higher regulation, namely in the production of new varieties. As in the case of ETCR,
the e¤ect of regulation in the simple model is again positive and signicant for PMR-Public
(column [7]). The di¤erentiated e¤ect of regulation is also suggested here. Namely, one observes
a positive correlation between regulation and R&D e¤ort in HT industries. This time, contrary
to the aggregate PMR indicator, this also true in absolute terms and robust to clustering.
Overall these results based on the full sample are in line with the main models prediction
regarding the Schumpeterian equilibrium. As regulation increases, the dissuasive e¤ect of de-
fensive strategies can be reduced. R&D incentives are higher, but the nal impact of regulation
25Usual rankings of regulation at the national level are quite in line with the picture generated by this indicator.
For instance, in average in our sample, Greece and Italy appear as the most regulated countries. UK and US on
the contrary are in the opposite extreme.
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is modulated by the size of innovation since it shapes monopolist incentives. This prediction
implies that the positive e¤ect of regulation should empirically be found when the size of inno-
vation is higher. This is conrmed by the estimates of the interaction term in all regressions
and by the overall marginal e¤ect in almost all of them, namely in those using the most e¢ cient
proxies of regulation.
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3.3.2 Robustness checks
This section analyses whether the above-presented results are due to potential bias such as the
omission of time-varying controls, the denition of the HT industries or the elimination of the
dummy HT in the within-group regressions.
Full set of controls Table 2 presents results using the full set of available controls. The
conclusions presented in the previous analysis also hold for these regressions. The same pattern
emerges: a positive e¤ect of regulation on R&D intensity in HT industries, both in relative and
absolute terms. The ME using REGIMP is even robust to clustering, despite the heavily reduced
sample size. While in general the new controls present a weak correlation, they appear with the
expected sign when the level of signicance is attained. This is the case of the capital labour
ratio and nancial assets over GDP in those regression using time-varying indicators (REGIMP
and ETCR). The lack of availability of capital stock heavily constrains the sample size and so
the e¢ ciency of estimations. This probably the reason why no conclusions can be drawn from
the proximity to the frontier. Consistent with the previous results, the proxy of international
R&D spillovers is also positively associated with R&D intensity. The increased magnitude of its
coe¢ cient and the wide compatibility of these results with those of Table 1, suggest that they
help to control for the unobserved heterogeneity that varies during time.
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Table 2. Dependent Variable: R&D/VA - Within-group estimates
Full control regressions
REGIMP ETCR PMR PMR-Public
R&D Spillovers 0.342*** 0.364*** 0.331*** 0.318***
(0.069) (0.066) (0.070) (0.071)
Regulation -0.300 -0.384*** -0.262 0.371
(0.221) (0.105) (0.332) (0.321)
Regulation x HT 1.558*** 0.817*** 0.641*** 0.818*
(0.288) (0.123) (0.188) (0.418)
Proximity 0.043 0.030 0.036 0.044
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
Capital Intensity 0.161** 0.160** 0.133 0.113
(0.082) (0.079) (0.086) (0.085)
Investment assets 0.115 0.131* 0.079 0.107
(0.084) (0.077) (0.084) (0.079)
Constant -2.868** -2.109** -2.475** -3.395***
(1.109) (1.021) (1.004) (0.662)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 1110 1110 1110 1110
Number of groups 98 98 98 98
Marginal e¤ect 1.258*** 0.433*** 0.379 1.189***
(0.337) (0.147) (0.355) (0.396)
[0.643] [0.264] [0.438] [0.513]
Notes: Hubert-White corrected standard errors in round parentheses
and clustered at the industry level in squared brackets.
*, **,*** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Wider denition of HT industries HT dummy variable is redened now to incorporate
other activities using intensively ICT industries as suppliers, namely industries 29 (machinery
and equipment) and 34 (motor vehicles). Table 3 presents the results for the four regulation
proxies. In these regressions, the economy-wide controls that proved to have weak correlation
with R&D intensity have been removed. Here again, the main prediction of the Schumpeterian
equilibrium is conrmed. The interaction term gives support for a positive and signicant impact
of regulation on R&D intensity, which is specic for high tech industries. This time however,
in the regression using PMR, a negative e¤ect appears in the overall marginal e¤ect (signicant
only at 10%). In the rest of regressions the signicantly positive ME is still observed.
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Table 3. Dependent Variable: R&D/VA - Within-group estimates
Alternative denition of high-tech industries (HT2)
REGIMP ETCR PMR PMR-Public
R&D Spillovers 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.175*** 0.172***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.051)
Regulation -0.197 0.020 -0.935*** 0.127
(0.129) (0.071) (0.248) (0.274)
Regulation x HT2 1.088*** 0.481*** 0.568*** 1.314***
(0.167) (0.070) (0.114) (0.362)
Constant -1.906*** -2.796*** -2.088*** -3.826***
(0.310) (0.203) (0.216) (0.302)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 2754 2754 2754 2546
Number of groups 189 189 189 176
Marginal e¤ect 0.891*** 0.501*** -0.367* 1.441***
(0.192) (0.101) (0.219) (0.319)
Notes: Hubert-White corrected standard errors in round parentheses
and clustered at the industry level in squared brackets.
HT2 includes all previously dened HT industries plus
Machinery (24) and Motor Vehicles (34)
*, **,*** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Fixed-e¤ect vector decomposition One may also argue that the results presented in the
previous section are basically driven by the correlation between R&D intensity and the HT
dummy itself. Under this argument, what has been reported as a positive e¤ect of regulation
specic to HT industries might merely reect that HT industries are more R&D intensive.
However, notice that what is estimated is the impact of regulation conditional on considering
only HT industries. As explained in section 3.1, even if HT dummy has been dropped by the
within-group transformation, its e¤ect is implicitly controlled by the xed e¤ect. As an explicit
robustness check on this issue, xed-e¤ect decomposition regressions are run (see Plümper and
Troeger, 2007). The methodology consists of three stages. First, a xed-e¤ect model is estimated
in order to obtain a measure of the unobserved xed heterogeneity. The second stage correlates
this residual measure with time-invariant variables, those that are eliminated in the usual within-
group strategy. This step then decomposes the xed e¤ect into a part explained by time-
invariant variables and an unexplained one. The third stage re-estimates the model by OLS and
includes the unexplained error term accounted in the second step. This nal step also controls
for collinearity between time-varying and time-invariant variables and it adjusts the degrees
of freedom. Results are presented in Table 4. Panel corrected standard errors are reported.
After addressing the non-variability of the HT dummy, the positive e¤ect of regulation on HT
industries is still supported in relative and absolute terms by the time-varying indicators ETCR
and REGIMP. Regressions using these time-varying indicators are more reliable for xed-e¤ect
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decomposition because the xed e¤ect estimated in the rst step is less likely to be correlated
with them. Accordingly to this, PMR and PMR-Public have been included into the vector of
time-invarying variables. In relative terms (i.e. the interaction) results still hold for PMR and
PMR- public. However, the estimated variance of the parameters do not allow to conclude a
value di¤erent than zero for the ME estimated with these proxies.
Table 4. Dependent Variable: R&D/VA - FEVD
Plümper and Troeger (2007) estimator
REGIMP ETCR PMR PMR-Public
R&D Spillovers 0.195*** 0.196*** 0.188*** 0.186**
(0.059) (0.057) (0.072) (0.079)
Regulation -0.166* 0.019 -0.666*** -0.550***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.027) (0.010)
Regulation x HT 1.739*** 0.715*** 0.826** 2.076**
(0.102) (0.048) (0.360) (0.973)
HT 5.226*** 0.466*** 0.893*** -0.643***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.060) (0.062)
eta 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Constant -3.195*** -2.893*** -2.420*** -2.923***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.032)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 2754 2754 2754 2546
Marginal e¤ect 1.573*** 0.734*** 0.161 1.526
(0.083) (0.058) (0.350) (0.975)
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses;
*, **,*** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
3.3.3 A di¤erentiated e¤ect of regulation depending on its level
The results analysed so far are based on the full sample. This section examines if behind these
"average" results there is evidence supporting proposition 6. The equilibrium underlying this
proposition arises below a certain level of regulation. Here the thread of competition translates
into a market structure characterised by an active innovative leader that besides its innovative
activities devotes resources to deter its competitors. Contrary to the Schumpeterian equilibrium,
here if regulation increases but still not enough to make the economy jump to a continuous
replacement, it will reduce the aggregate R&D e¤ort since it will just consume more resources for
defensive purposes without altering the power of the leader. Hence, regressions here ask whether
it is possible to nd a di¤erentiated e¤ect of regulation depending on its level. The only well
suited indicator for this exercise is the knock-on e¤ect of regulation (REGIMP) because of its
time-series cross-section data structure, that allows to split the sample and to exploit di¤erent
sources of variations.
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Table 5 compares the results for the 10% of country-industries with the lowest level of
regulation (rst column) with those obtained for the 50% most regulated (second column).
Fixed-e¤ect decomposition is used in order to avoid limitations of intra-group variance (see
robustness check section). As theoretically expected, when the level of regulation is very low
a regressions show a statistic signicant change in the sign of estimates. In both absolute and
relative terms regressions support the idea of a negative impact of an increase of regulation in
already deregulated environments. On the contrary, when the level of regulation is above the
median one observes the main type of results exposed above.
Table 5. Dependent Variable: R&D/VA - FEVD
Proxy: Knock-on e¤ect of regulation (REGIMP)
0.1 quantile > 0.5 quantile
R&D Spillovers -0.048*** 0.184***
(0.015) (0.012)
REGIMP -0.145 -0.733***
(0.164) (0.135)
REGIMP x HT -0.470** 4.153***
(0.216) (0.250)
HT 0.714 9.307***
(0.576) (0.467)
eta 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.017) (0.010)
Constant -4.691*** -5.053***
(0.434) (0.242)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Number of Obs 476 875
Marginal e¤ect -0.614*** 3.419***
(0.151) (0.223)
Note: *, **,*** denote signicance at
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
An alternative way to interpret these ndings is under the grid of macro-institutional liter-
ature highlighting the diversity of capitalism (see for instance Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable
2003). While o¤ering a variety of topologies and institutional mechanisms, a common point of
these works is that there is no such a so-called "best practice" model. On the contrary, di¤erent
institutional arrangements may lead to what is usually seen as good economic performance. In
Table 6 regressions are split considering 5 group of countries: Market-based (US and UK ); Social
Democratic (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden); Continental Europe (Belgium, France, Germany,
Norway, Ireland and Netherlands), Mediterranean Europe (Spain and Italy) and Japan. This
typology broadly follows Amable (2003) who identies these ve distinctive models based on
factor analysis and clustering over several institutional elds.
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In line with the two type of theoretical equilibriums, regressions point out that Market-
based countries, characterised by deregulated entrepreneurial environments are in fact economies
in which regulation is detrimental to R&D e¤ort. On the other hand, in more coordinated
economies such as Continental European countries and Japan, regulation acts as R&D boosting
device. No signicant results appear for the case of Italy an Spain where most of the variance
is explained by country, year and industry xed e¤ects. Finally, somewhat surprising is the neg-
ative correlation between regulation and R&D intensity in Social Democratic countries. These
economies are usually seen as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon model. This view is actually true
but mainly in terms of welfare state. These countries are, in average, bellow the median value
of regulation. They also present some heterogeneity, namely in the second half of the period,
where for instance Sweden and Denmark have applied regulatory reforms more intensely (see
Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). Hence, these results can be interpreted following the theoretical
model: regulation can boost innovative e¤ort, but only after attaining a certain threshold that
allows to create a market environment in which defensive strategies are handled.
Table 6 - Dependent Variable: R&D/VA - OLS regressions by group of countries
Proxy: Knock-on e¤ect of regulation (REGIMP)
MB SD CE ME JP
R&D Spillovers 0.329*** 0.074 -0.067 -0.202 0.187***
(0.096) (0.100) (0.098) (0.165) (0.037)
REGIMP -0.763*** -1.089*** 1.212*** 0.186 5.043***
(0.116) (0.181) (0.119) (0.525) (1.200)
Constant -4.534*** -6.134*** -2.515*** -6.483*** 14.166***
(0.479) (0.629) (0.522) (0.954) (2.350)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISIC 2-dig dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 388 644 1118 396 208
Notes: Hubert-White standard errors in parentheses;
MB: Market-based (US, UK)
SD: Social Democratic (Finland, Sweden, Denmark)
CE: Continental Europe (Belgium, France, Germany,Norway, Ireland, Netherlands)
ME: Mediterranean Europe (Spain and Italy)
JP: Japan
*, **,*** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
4 Conclusion
This paper has presented in a simple quality-ladders model the consequences of defensive strate-
gies on R&D e¤ort and market structure. Among the multiplicity of available strategies, defen-
sive reactions may increase the cost of R&D beyond the pure technological dynamics. Institu-
38
tions constraining this set of strategies and reducing the resulting deterring e¤ects may increase
the resources devoted to innovation. This e¤ect however is likely to be observed after a certain
level of regulation and for big technology jumps. The evolution of R&D expenditure in OECD
industries conrms the former results, specially for time-varying indicators of market regula-
tion. In general, regressions provide clear results. In most specications, regulation positively
inuences R&D in high-technology industries.
Does the positive correlation between the OECDs indicators of regulation and R&D intensity
implies that one should take as "good policies" all those practices covered by these indicators?
Of course no, however some of them can positively inuence innovation by organising techno-
logical competition. Hence, labeling regulation practices as "appropriate" or "inappropriate"
for innovation requires a detailed context specication. The message of this paper is to study
them in a more neutral way: as rules of the game. Further e¤orts should be addressed to em-
pirically analyse them with rm demographic data and provide a deeper scrutiny of the models
mechanisms.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of theoretical propositions
A.1.1 Proof of proposition 1
The necessity of this condition comes from the fact that any credible commitment of a high
R&D e¤ort depends on the capability of the leader to perform, at least, a positive amount
of R&D when free entry in research is possible. Equation (11) shows that the leader rm
does perform R&D when L [vL (j! + 1)  vL (j!)]  1: If free entry applies, then vL (j! + 1) =
1
o(j!+1)
= (j!+1)
h cos j!
: One can obtain vL (j!) by adjusting for one step down in the quality-ladder:
vL (j!) =
1
o(j!)
= (j!+1)
 [ 1]
h cos j! 1
: Putting these elements together and assuming that j! = 
yields (12).
To show the su¢ ciency, observe rst the properties of the equilibrium with permanent mo-
nopolist. Notice that because of constant returns to scale of the R&D investment, if (12) holds
as an strict inequality, the optimal R&D e¤ort for the leader is unbounded. If (12) holds as
equality, the leader rm can perform any nite amount of R&D e¤ort. In both cases it can
invest in R&D without taking into account outsiders menace. To show this, assume that (12)
holds true. The leading position value (11) must be then evaluated for `o = 0. The only case
39
ensuring a positive and nite R&D investment of the leader is when:26
vL (j! + 1)  vL (j!) = 1
L (j! + 1)
(32)
Putting the value of vL (j! + 1) implied by (32) into (11) (when `o = 0) yields the present
optimal value of a permanent monopolist leader written in equation (13). At equilibrium, the
interest rate must verify (32), otherwise the leader carries out zero R&D e¤ort or an unbounded
amount. Using the monopolist prots equation (6) and (13), one obtains the interest rate
expressed in (14).
It should be proven now that this equilibrium, obtained when the credibility condition (12)
holds, is not a protable outcome for outsiders. Consider equation (10). The self-selection of
outsiders in R&D races requires
vL (j! + 1) <
1
o (j! + 1)
(33)
Using the optimal value vL (j! + 1) stated in (13), prots (6) and the denition of o (j! + 1)
gives:
 (j! + 1) 
1   [ 1] <  (j! + 1)cos  (34)
where   c(; )p 1
p
EL
Q
> 0.
This self-selection condition is indeed implied by the credibility condition (12). To see it,
multiply both sides of (12) by  (j! + 1) > 0 to obtain:
 (j! + 1)
1   [ 1]   (j! + 1)cos 
Since  > 0, the fulllment of (12) then veries:27
 (j! + 1) 
1   [ 1] <  (j! + 1)1   [ 1]   (j! + 1)cos  (35)
Thus, if the leader is credible outsiders will not carry out R&D. This establishes proposition 1.
26Klette and Griliches (2000) in their Appendix A argue that the leader R&D investment in the closely-related
model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) do not satisfy the second order condition of optimality. Here, when
maximising the RHS of the corresponding Bellman equation, the leader investment is derived using a standard
CRS-equilibrium rationale as, by construction, one does not deal with a concave objective fonction.
27Notice that from (32) the equilibrium with permanent monopolist happens when the credibility condition
holds as equality. Since the RHS inequality in (35) is unambigously strict, the self-selection condition will still be
satised.
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A.1.2 Proof of proposition 2
By the maximum principle, the choice of j! ;is determined by the rst order condition of the
RHS of (16). To compute it, use c (j! ; ) as dened by (8). This gives:
cos+ j! =
 f
I0LvL (j!) L (j!)
Recall that the free entry condition in the previous R&D race (the one that the incumbent
has won) states: vL (j!) = 1o(j!) =
1
L(j!) cos j! 1
. After applying this, the rst order condition
can be written as
cos j! = cos

+ j! 1

 f
I0L
 1
+ 
Dene now k 

 f
I0L
 1
+ 
;  + < 1; aj!  cos j! . The sequence of aj! = k aj! 1can be
expressed as aj! = k
(j!) where  (j!) =
j!P
j=0
j is a geometric series that converges towards 11  .
Thus, for a high enough level of j!; one has a = k
1
1  : Putting back the denitions of a; k and
 gives directly (17).
Appropriate second-order condition on the RHS of (16) requires:
H
2L (j!) cos +2 j!
< 0
where H  IoLL (j!) vL (j!)  cos+ j! [2   +  cos 2j! ] + f [ 2   +  cos 2j! ]. By
simple inspection, one notices that the second term in brackets is negative ( since  >  cos 2j!
). Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for H be negative is that 2 + cos 2j! < 0: After using the
identity cos 2 = 2 cos2   1; observe that this happens when 1
[1 cos2 ] < : Given the solution
of the rst-order condition, this is implicitly ensured when  is su¢ ciently high.
A.1.3 Proof of proposition 4
The threshold  is the one solving cos  =

1   [ 1]. Denote 
 ( )  cos  =  [ 1 1] fn    
and   1   [ 1] : To prove proposition 4, it su¢ ces to show that 
 ( ) intercepts  once
for cos  2 ]0; 1] : Taking appropriate derivative gives:
@
 ( )
@ 
=
 
 [    ]2
"
 1   1 f
n
# 
  
"
    +  ln
 
 1   1 f
n
!#
Using the expression for cos ; @
( )@ reduces to:
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@
 ( )
@ 
=
  cos 
 [    ] [1   ln (cos )]
Moreover,
 Since  >  then  cos  [  ] > 0
 Since cos  2 ]0; 1] then 1   ln (cos ) > 0
Thus @
( )@ > 0;which means that 
 ( ) is a monotonically increasing function of  : Fur-
thermore, for  > 1 and  > 1 one veries that  < 1: Hence, for relevant values of cos  there
exists a unique intercept between 
 and : 
A.1.4 Proof of proposition 5
By simple inspection of (27) one veries that sr ( )is increasing in  . Analytically, using price
setting p =  and (27), the e¤ect of  on sr is:
dsr
d 
=
n2 [   1] 2+
f [n [   1] + ] +  [n [ +  ]   ]g2 > 0
Notice that sr is a concave function of  :
d2sr
d 2
=
 2n2 [   1] 2+ f [n  ] +  [n [   1] + ]g
f [n [   1] + ] +  [n [ +  ]   ]g3 < 0
It is easy to see that the term in braces in the numerator is positive since  > : The
same remark applies to the denominator. Hence d
2sr
d 2
< 0 meaning that sr is concave on  
for any possible value of the size of innovation ( > 1) : An envelope-theorem rationale can be
applied. Observing that, as  increases, the function sr ( ) converges asymptotically towards
its maximum sr () = lim
 !1
sr( ) = n[ 1]

n[ ++1]+[ ] . If
dsr()
d > 0 then the shape of sr ( )
is positively a¤ected by : To verify this, take partial derivatives.
dsr ()
d
=
n f+ [n  ] [1 +  [   1]]g
f [n  ] +  [n [   1] + ]g2
The sign of this expression depends crucially on the sign of the braces in the numerator.
If n > 0 the su¢ cient condition for dsr()d > 0 is that G ()     1    [   1]  0. Since
dG()
d = 

 1   1 > 0 and G (1) = 0 ; G is a continuous monotonically increasing function of
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 that is positive for any value of  2 ]1;1[ : Hence the slope of sr ( ) increases with the size
of innovation.
A.1.5 Proof of proposition 5
Analysing the e¤ect of  on srm ( ) :
dsrm( )
d 
=
f

1   ( 1)1   ln 1   ( 1)
n

1 + fn

1   ( 1)1   + n[ 1]
Since 0 < 1   ( 1) < 1 it follows that dsrmd < 0:Thus, srm is decreasing in  :
A.2 Sample summary
List of countries: Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Nether-
lands; Norway; Spain; Sweden; UK; US
Table A1 - List of industries
ISIC Rev 3 Code Industry
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco
17-19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
17 Textiles
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur
19 Leather, leather products and footwear
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21-22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastics products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
30 O¢ ce, accounting and computing machinery
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec
32 Radio, television and communication equipment
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
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Table A2 - Descriptive statistics
Variable Number of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev./Mean
R&D / Value-added 2850 0,09 0,17 1,89
PMR 5760 1,80 0,44 0,24
PMR-Public 6375 3,01 1,28 0,42
ETCR 6375 4,19 1,31 0,31
REGIMP 6375 0,13 0,04 0,28
Proximity to the frontier 6099 56,89 24,07 0,42
Capital Intensity 2785 0,05 0,03 0,68
Financial assets/GDP 4440 66,91 50,33 0,75
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